ABSTRACT Considering the tradable credits' characteristics of public goods, this paper incorporated public pricing method into the tradable credits pricing analysis. Also, in view of budget imbalance of marginal cost pricing, we tried to make a price for the tradable credit by using an average pricing method. This paper constructed an average pricing method of tradable credits by the angles of travel behavior and economics. The main work of this paper is listed as follows: (1) Consumers and producers of tradable credits in the traffic network are defined, and their mathematical constraints are given; (2) Under the tradable credits scheme, the production cost function of producers and demanding function of consumers are analyzed; (3) The mathematical description of average pricing is given; and (4) At last, the process of average pricing on tradable credits are reappeared by a simple numerical example, which average pricing's efficiency on tradable credits. In a word, average cost pricing pushes the application of tradable credits scheme in urban traffic management forward, which has certain theoretical and practical significance to improve the urban traffic demand management.
another flat tax [2] [3] [4] . In order to explore more equitable and acceptable pricing schemes, various methods have been analyzed, which include negative tolls [5] , [6] , Pareto-improving pricing schemes [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Unfortunately, although revenue redistribution and the Pareto-improvement schemes are effective, the government plays a role as an objectionable toll collector [1] .
Considering the resistance to congestion tolls, the capand-auction scheme has begun to draw attention in transportation more recently. Tradable credits scheme is one of the cap-and-auction schemes. As a quantity-based control method, tradable credits scheme is regarded as one of the most feasible alternative tools of congestion pricing for its equality to travelers. More importantly, the government casts off the role as an objectionable toll collector. Therefore, tradable credits rise again in urban traffic management in recent years. One of the most representative researches is made by Yang and Wang [1] . They made a wonderful development in tradable credit schemes analysis which proved the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium link flow pattern with fixed or elastic demand in a general network context. Based on Yang and Wang [1] , various extensions from different angles are made by researchers.
Some scholars analyzed the effects of transaction costs on travel behavior [12] [13] [14] . They found that transaction costs reduce the trading volume of credits and change the market price. Some researches explored the tradable credits for congestion management with heterogeneous users [15] [16] [17] . According to Zhu et al. [17] , if travelers are assumed to be heterogeneous with a continuously distributed value of time (VOT), an appropriate credit distribution rule may make every traveler better off. In bottleneck congestion management [18] [19] [20] [21] , studies proved tradable credits can be used to eliminate morning commute congestion, and credit charge can be made equitable by suitably allocating the credits to the commuters. Wang et al. [22] , [23] , introduced tradable credits into continuous network design. They found the tradable credit scheme offers the better combination of cost-effectiveness, administrative flexibility and distributional fairness comparing with congestion pricing. Also, the effectiveness and efficiency of tradable credit scheme on enhancing transportation network capacity in a stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) modeling framework were also investigated by traffic scholars [24] , [25] .
Parts of researchers made some improvements for tradable credits schemes [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . Nie and Yin [26] designed a new tradable credit scheme for managing commuters' rush hour choices. Miralinaghi and Peeta [27] proposed the concept of multi-period tradable credit scheme for a planning context. Lahlou and Wynter [30] considered a tradable credits scheme for binary transport games where one option is faster (or more comfortable) than the other, but its quality of service suffers when usage is high. Other studies focused on the trip impact validation of tradable credits scheme [31] [32] [33] .
Tradable credits schemes are economically attractive because of their ability to reach a certain reduction goal. Compared to congestion pricing measures, tradable credits schemes enable participants to financially benefit from the system and ensure that money circulates among participants instead of flowing to regulating authorities. However, it may be not smooth in practical applications. Market equilibrium conditions may be difficult to reach in the free trading market because of the imperfect information of the market and traveler's bounded rationality or incomplete rationality. Thus, it is difficult to prevent speculators profiting from hoarding credits and selling them for a high price in busy periods. Under such circumstances, tradable credits may be inefficient compared with congestion pricing and the expected results will be discounted. Therefore, it brings a new question, i.e., is there a way that could ensure the tradable credit scheme's the practicalness? Gao et al. [34] had a try on a pricebased tradable credits scheme. They found that the pricebased tradable credits scheme is workable and applicable in managing congestion. In this paper, we try to make further efforts to discuss the price-based tradable credits in managing congestion. A public pricing-based tradable credit scheme is proposed to overcome the weak practicality of market-based tradable credit scheme.
The research on public pricing can be traced back to 1870s. In 1873, the Railway and Canal Commission discussed the optimal public pricing problem. However, most researches on public pricing focused on the middle and late 1970s from the retrieved literatures. Studies on public pricing focused on two angles. One is the fairness targeted public pricing theory [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] . The other one is the efficiency-oriented public pricing theory [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] .
Gao et al. [49] tried to have a public pricing on tradable credits from the angle of marginal cost pricing. They found that marginal cost pricing scheme could give the optimal solutions for public service corporations under the ideal environment. However, it has serious weaknesses. ''It did not take into account the stimulus to correct forecasting of having a subsequent market test whether consumers were willing to pay the total cost; it ignored the probable effects on the administrative structure, with state enterprise superceding private enterprise and centralized operations superceding decentralized operations; it failed to take into account the misallocation of resources resulting from the additional taxation necessitated by the subsidies.'' [50] .
Average pricing is one of the fairness targeted public pricing theory. Compared to the marginal cost pricing method, average pricing could better solve the fairness of income distribution in pricing process [35] . In this paper, a new average cost pricing on tradable credits scheme in managing mobility in a traffic network is defined. Traveler behavior and the government behavior are discussed under the average cost pricing scheme. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
(1) Average cost pricing method on tradable credits scheme in traffic management are proposed for the first time. Previous studies mainly focused on market-based pricing method. Considering the public characteristic of tradable credits in traffic, a kind of public pricing method-average cost pricing is proposed in this paper. (2) Traveler behavior is analyzed by two angles, traffic and economics. One on hand, it is described by the classic travel behavior analysis method-user equilibrium analysis. On the other hand, some economic definitions and methods are incorporate traveler behavior analysis. (3) Under the tradable credits scheme, the production cost function of ''producers'' and demanding function of ''consumers'' are analyzed. The mathematical description of average pricing is given. (4) A numerical example is used to simulate the process of average cost pricing.
For the remainder, the general average cost pricingbased tradable credits scheme is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 gives some mathematical definitions of economic behavior in traffic network with tradable credits scheme. Section 4 gives the mathematical description on production and average pricing in transportation. Section 5 validates the VOLUME 7, 2019 rationality of the new tradable credits scheme by a numerical example. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and gives some extensions for future study.
II. TRADABLE CREDITS SCHEME
Suppose there exists a network G = (N , A). N denotes the set of nodes in the network and a set A of direct links. W represents the set of all OD pairs and a set R w of routes between an OD pair w ∈ W in the network. The OD demand between w can be represented by d w , w ∈ W and v a denotes the flow on link a ∈ A.
A. CREDITS DISTRIBUTION
The government is the direct ''producer''. Suppose the government is neither a seller nor a purchaser, but a price maker. Credits are uniformly distributed to every traveler for free. K is the total number of credits distributed by the government. D represents the total OD demands in the network. k is the number of credits of every traveler in a uniform distribution scheme, which can be written as follows,
B. CREDITS CHARGE AND TRADING CREDITS
Credits charge is link-specific, which is denoted by κ a , a ∈ A. Suppose credits charge is nonnegative. Travelers trade with each other on an online platform (such as Alibaba and Amazon) in a fixed price which is determined by the government. The platform will display the total trading volumes of the system and the remaining quantity of every user in real time. The government supervises the running of the platform. Suppose the transaction is low enough that it can be ignored.All taxpayers (travelers) are eligible to receive free credits.
C. MARGINAL COST PRICING AND AVERAGE PRICING ON TRADABLE CREDITS SCHEME
The marginal cost pricing could maximize the social welfare from the angle of social welfare. However, the marginal cost pricing couldn't bring enough income to offset the total cost, which leads to the unbalance of the budget. According to Hotelling [51] , when producers can't be remedied totally under the marginal cost pricing scheme, the loss of producers could be remedied by the exogenous government subsidies. However, government subsidies increase the government financial pressure. For tradable credits scheme, the redundant tradable credits would be purchased by the government, which will increase the government financial pressure because of the huge number of travelers. It is illustrated as following by three cases, i.e., marginal cost regression, increasing and constant: Fig.1 shows the government subsidy under the case of the marginal cost regression. In Fig.1 , the horizontal axis denotes the demand of tradable credits. The vertical axis represents the credit price. MC is marginal cost curve. AC is the average cost curve.D denotes the demand curve. Considering the marginal cost is decreasing, MC curve is under the AC curve. If the government makes pricing based on marginal cost, ''producers'' will have a deficit because of financial revenue falling behinds of expenditure. In this case, the government will have subsidies on ''producers''. As shown in Fig.1 , the credit price is P 1 under the marginal cost pricing. The revenues and total costs of ''producers'' can be denoted by areas of OP 1 CF and OABF respectively. Area of OABF is bigger than area of OP 1 CF. The government will have subsidies and the allowance is the area of ABCP 1 . Fig.2 shows the cases of average cost regression when the marginal cost of fixed cost is constant or steadily increase. As shown in Fig.2 , the credit price is P 1 with the marginal cost pricing and the output of credits is OF. The average cost is bigger than marginal cost. The producers are deficit and the government will have subsidies. The allowance is the area of ABCP 1 .
Therefore, marginal cost pricing will lead the problem of ''producers'' loss. In order to remedy the loss of ''producers'' and increase the producers' enthusiasm, the government will have subsidies on producers. However, in a city, the number of producers acted by travelers is huge, which increases the financial burden greatly.
We can see P 1 is the optimal price which is price by the average cost from Fig.1 and Fig.2 . On one hand, it satisfies the budgetary equilibrium of ''producers'', which reduces the government financial burden. On the other hand, for the case of marginal cost regression, the cost can't be remedied if the credit price is lower than P 2 . Otherwise, the social welfare is not the maximum.
According to the budgetary equilibrium, the following mathematical equation is satisfied:
In Eq. (2), p is the credit price, K is the total number of credits, c(K ) is the production cost. The average cost pricing can be written as follows:
III. MATHEMATICAL DEFINITION OF TRAVELER BEHAVIOR A. PRODUCERS
Under the tradable credits scheme, there are two kinds of producers. One is the direct producers, i.e., the government. The other is the indirect producers, i.e., the travelers want to reap benefits from tradable credits. Next, we defined the indirect producers of tradable credits scheme. Definition 1: If a traveler has redundant credits when he/she finishes the trip, we call the traveler the ''producer'', and the redundant credits are his/her supply quantity (output). It can be represented by the following inequality:
where inequality (4) denotes the total credits charge on route r is less than or equal to the amount of initial distribution. R w represents the set of route between OD pair w. The routes which meet the inequality (4) can be denoted by a set R w .δ a,r is 1 if route r uses link a and 0 otherwise. Then the total supply of credits on the network can be written as follows:
where f r denotes the equilibrium flow on route r after a tradable credits scheme is implemented.
B. CONSUMERS
Definition 2: If the amount of initial distribution is less than the total charge on route r, travelers on this route need to purchase credits to finish their trips. We call these travelers ''consumers''. The demand for credits of a ''consumer'' on route r can be represented as follows:
So the total demand for credits can be written as follows:
where R w denotes the set of routes which satisfy inequality (7). According to Yang and Wang [1] , the equilibrium credit price is positive only when all the issued credits are consumed. However, under the price-based tradable credits scheme, credits may be residual after trading. The redundant credits can be written as:
In Eq. (8), v a is the flow of link a. Q denotes the amount of unused tradable credits.
C. PRODUCTION COST
In this paper, there are two kinds of producers, the government and the travelers with redundant credits (i.e., sellers of credits). Therefore, production cost contains two parts, the government's production cost and travelers' production cost. The production costs of government include three parts, the government service cost for credits distribution, platform construction and operation. Here, for simplicity, suppose the government's production cost is fixed, which is denoted by M . For travelers, their costs mainly contain the increased time cost and fuel consumption that travelers transfer from the original routes to the new routes after a tradable credit scheme is implemented. Here only the increased time cost is consider. After the tradable credits scheme being implemented, some travelers would transfer to the routes with less credits charge to obtain credits benefits. Some travelers would still their routes by paying more tradable credits. Time and credits are two kinds of ''commodities'' from the economic point of view. Travelers could trade with each other based on credit price. We gave two simple examples to help understanding the producers, consumers, production cost and traffic flow transfer and the productive process of tradable credits in tradable credits scheme. Fig.3 illustrates the transaction process between ''producers'' and ''consumers'' in the traffic network. In Fig.3 , some travelers ''produce'' the tradable credits by giving up parts of travelling time. Thus tradable credits are valuable products. Then they could get the benefit by selling them. These travelers are called ''producers''. As shown in Fig. 3 , the blue arrows describe the process, i.e., traveler A spends time to produce tradable credits and then trade for money. Thus she/he becomes a producer. Some travelers purchase credits from ''producers'' to save their travelling time to engage in other more valuable ''commodity'' production. These travelers are called ''consumers''. The red arrows in Fig. 3 shows the process, i.e., traveler B spends money to obtain tradable credits for save time become consumer.
In this process, the transactions are finished between ''producers'' and ''consumers'' by the credit price. Fig.4 shows the process of travelers producing tradable credits in the actual traffic network. In Fig.4 , there exists one OD, three routes, a, b and c.
(a) The user equilibrium before tradable credits scheme being implemented According to Fig.4(a) , before the tradable credits scheme being implemented, travel cost equals to travel time cost when the traffic network reaches equilibrium.
Suppose route a's travel cost is 6 and the flow of route a satisfies v a = 0; route b's travel cost is 3, the flow of route b satisfies v b = 7; route c's travel cost is 3, the flow of route c satisfies v c = 5. Thus the minimum travel cost is 3 between O and D when the network reaches equilibrium.
(b) The user equilibrium after tradable credits scheme being implemented According to Fig.4(b) , after the tradable credits being implemented, suppose the number of distributed tradable credits to every traveler satisfies k = 3. The credit price satisfies p = 1. The credits charge on route a (κ a ) is 0. The credits charge on route b (κ b ) is 5. The credits charge on route c (κ c ) is 3.
(c) The process of travelers producing tradable credits In order to reap benefits, some travelers will transfer to route a which has no credits charge (κ a = 0) from other routes (suppose only travelers on route b transfer route a). When the traffic network is equilibrium, the flow of route av a = 3 (i.e., 3 travelers transfer to route a from route b). Each of the 3 travelers ''produce'' 3 credits (i.e., k − κ a = 3 − 0 = 3) by changing their travel route. Accordingly, their travel time cost increases to t a = 6 from t b = 3. That is to say, in order to produce 3 credits, they pay 3 more time cost, i.e., their production cost is t a − t b = 3. On the other hand, they could get benefits by selling the produced credits. The benefits is p * (k − κ a ) = 3. Route a's travel cost equals to travel time cost minus the benefits on route a, i.e., c a = t a − p * (k − κ a ) = 6 − 1 * (3 − 0) = 3.
For route b, because the number of travelers decreases, congestion alleviated. 
For route c, credits charge (κ c = 3) equals to credits distribution (k = 3) and there is no flow transfer. Its travelling cost is 3. In summary, the minimum cost is 3 between OD after tradable credits being implemented.
IV. MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION ON PRODUCTION AND AVERAGE PRICING IN TRAFFIC NETWORK
According to Wardrop equilibrium, urban traffic network will reach equilibrium, i.e., all used routes' costs are the minimum. Suppose the minimum cost is u w between OD pair w. Any two routes r i and r j between OD pair w satisfy the following relations:
, and r i , r j ∈ R w (9) where t a (v a ) denotes the equilibrium cost on link a. f r i is the flow of route r i and f r j is the flow of route r j .
After a tradable credits scheme being implemented, if there is no flow transfer among routes, two routes with different credits charge will satisfy the following inequality:
Eq. (9) denotes that if route r i and r j exist flow, the equilibrium travelling cost is u w before the tradable credits scheme being implemented. After the tradable credits being implemented, if the credits charge on route r i is bigger than the credits charge on route r j , the cost of route r i is bigger than the cost of route r j . Therefore, if Eq. (10) exist, travelers will re-select routes. Accordingly, network flows will be redistributed until new equilibrium reaches. Suppose the new equilibrium cost is u w . It can be written as follows:
In Eq. (11), v a and t a (v a ) denotes the flow and cost of link a after the tradable credits being implemented. f r i and f r j are the flow of routes r j and r j respectively.
According to Eqs. (10) and (11), the time costs of routes r i and r j satisfy the following relationship:
f r j > 0 and r i ∈ R w , r j ∈ R w , r i = r j (12) Eq. (12) represents the time cost of route r j is bigger than the time cost of route r i . Accordingly, the credits charge fees on route r j is smaller than on route r i . We call the travelers ''producers'' who transfer to route r j . The time cost difference before and after transfer is the production cost, which can be written as follows: (13) Therefore, the total production costs of travelers on the traffic network can be written as follows:
where α is the value of time. In general, link flow and route flow satisfy the following relationship:
According to previous analysis on tradable credits scheme, all producers' costs can be written as follows:
where c(K ) denotes the total costs with the total number of credits K . Item 1 on the right side of the equation is the government service cost and the second one is total production costs. According to Eqs. (3) and (5), the average cost pricing can be written as follows:
In Eq. (17), M /K denotes the average cost that the government distributes K credits. p is the average cost that travelers produce S credits.
V. SIMULATING THE AVERAGE PRICING PROCESS ON TRADABLE CREDITS SCHEME
In order to intuitively and clearly simulate the average pricing process of tradable credits scheme for readers, in this section, we give a mini and simple network instead of a large and complex network.
As shown in Fig. 5 , there are three links connecting a single O-D pair. The travel demand is 10. A total amount of 30 credits is uniformly distributed to all travelers, and the credit charge for using link 1, link 2 and link 3 is 4, 2 and 1 respectively, thus, K = 30, κ = (4, 2, 1) T . Let (1)The user equilibrium before tradable credits scheme being implemented
The following conditions are obtained when the traffic network reaches equilibrium. (2) Average pricing on tradable credits User equilibrium can be described as follows after tradable credits scheme being implemented.
The flows f route a, b and c are obtained by combing equations (18), (19) and (20) .
, v 3 = 9 + 7p 5 According to the cost functions of a, b, c, the equilibrium costs of a, b, c can be written as follows:
Based on the previous analysis on production cost, producer's production cost can be represented as follows:
The following equation can be obtained by combing Eqs. (5) and (17):
The average cost price can be denoted as follows:
The average cost price is about 2.1 by calculating Eq. (23).
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper tries to incorporate average cost pricing into the public pricing of tradable credits scheme in traffic network management. Compared to marginal cost pricing, average cost pricing satisfies the budgetary equilibrium of ''producers'', which reduces the government financial burden.
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Unlike marginal cost pricing, it is a suboptimal pricing method and the social welfare could only reach the suboptimal state. However, it provides a reference for decision makers in traffic management. In this paper, traveler behavior is analyzed with the angle of transport and economics. ''Producers'', ''consumers'', ''production cost'' and ''demand function'' are defined. The process of trading between ''producers'' and ''consumers'', the flow transfer and producing tradable credits in the traffic network are analyzed. ''Production cost function'' and average cost pricing method are given using mathematical models by combing the actual traffic network. Beyond this preliminary research, there are some potentially interesting topics for further study. Under the price-based tradable credits schemes, in real-size network, the number of routes may be huge, which will waste a lot of time if we list them one by one. In view of this, in future research, we could eliminate the invalid routes based on traveler habits and behavior. The specific comparison with quantity-based tradable credits schemes also need to be studied in future. The analysis on social welfare maximization and minimum system cost by jointing the optimal price of credits and the optimal credits charge scheme. Furthermore, the current modeling of credit schemes applies only to homogeneous users but it could also be extended to the heterogeneous case. Besides the above interesting topics, the multi-modal, elastic demand and stochastic demand are also should be explored in future. He has published over 30 papers and has given several presentations at national and international conferences. His research interests include traffic information collecting, and transportation control, traffic operations, the theory and technology of connected vehicle.
